Archive for the ‘Philosophy’ Category

The Basis for Predictions

Monday, May 11th, 2009

In a previous post I discussed the well-known fact that economists’ predictions are always wrong, and why they always are. But one obvious problem with predictions was left out of the discussion, and I would like to discuss this problem in a separate post. In contrast to the previous post, which was quite general in tone and content, this issue is mainly methodological and somewhat philosophical.

The previous post discussed the problems of measurement and the very problematic assumption that “people are like rocks,” i.e. that individuals share a fixed and observable nature in the same way that rocks have common simple properties. I also stretched the discussion to cover the ever present tension between the Weberian concepts of erklären and verstehen.

The former kind of science strictly emphasizes explaining facts and establishing simple causal relationships that can be derived from the observable properties of the entity. The latter stresses the subjective understanding of what is going on, and finding a way of rationally establishing a way to “see” how things work and are related. Weber explicitly states that erklären is the purpose and method unique for the natural sciences whereas the social sciences need to have a verstehen-based perspective. Predictions, hence, are possible only in sciences based on the erklären methodology and this is the conflict in economics: a fundamentally social science attempting to make use of primarily (only?) the methods and methodology of the natural sciences.

But predictions are problematic in and of themselves even if we ignore the tension arising from using erklären methodology studying verstehen phenomena. The very nature of predictions imply the usage of historic data to say something about the future. As we know, and have known at least since the days of the Ancient Greeks, it does not follow from the fact that the sun has risen every morning for centuries that it will continue to do so. History and future are not the same and may even be very different. What makes the future so troublesome is that it is fundamentally uncertain and we cannot use the certain facts of history to create knowledge about it.

As was stressed in the previous post, extrapolating doesn’t necessarily make sense. Doing the same maneuver for predictions about the future from data about historical events makes even less sense. Tomorrow will not be exactly like yesterday, which is a fact everybody knows and should know. This fact is true for details as well. That a rock falls to the ground if dropped today does not mean it will do so tomorrow.

However, we can conclude that a rock will fall to the ground if dropped tomorrow if we can show what makes it drop and we can rely on the properties of these causes being the same tomorrow. A rock has a fixed nature with certain properties and these do not change. We have been able to establish that a rock is dead matter that responds to exogenous forces in a very reliable and predictable way – we know that a rock is a rock is a rock and that this means something in terms of its nature.

It may be the case that tomorrow does not have gravity or that all rocks have turned into lollipops, but that doesn’t change the fact that rocks, according to our defintion, are rocks and that they respond to different forces in certain ways. We cannot with complete certainty say that everything will be the same tomorrow, but we can make general statements that will hold true for the things, forces, and properties we have specified (if we have done a good job specifying them). 

Now try the same thing with a human being. An individual is an individual is an individual. If this is true in the same sense as a rock is a rock, then we should be able to establish if one and every individual likes ice cream, responds the same way to stimuli like heat and cold, reacts to a certain situation the same way with a high level of certainty. 

Try the latter and compare a rock with an individual. Expose the rock to exogenous forces and observe its “behavior” and what happens to it. Then expose an individual to some stimuli and observe the behavior. Repeat it and observe the behavior – is it exactly the same? You will find that different individuals react in different ways to stimuli – and that one individual’s reactions will change over time as he or she learns. The rock never learns.

So even if the way a rock is affected by certain experiments is not purely certain for the future, it is very much predictable. The way John Doe reacts to, e.g., a speeding car about to hit him is different every time – and may not [ever] be the same as how Jane Doe reacts. It is not predictable; we cannot know what will happen (i.e. how the individual will react). 

So how will people react to lower prices in a certain good? We can attempt to predict that tomorrow, if the price for widgets is 10% lower, people will purchase 500,000 more widgets. But that doesn’t make sense. If the price is indeed lower it does not follow that the people who bought a widget yesterday at the higher price are more likely to buy a widget again. It also doesn’t follow that people in general value the widget in the same way. 

The only thing we can say is that ceteris paribus people will tend to purchase more of the cheaper good, at least for as long as they subjectively expect to be better off through purchasing one [more]. People want to be better off (which follows from the definition of better) and therefore make choices to improve their situation – to the best of their ability. But their preferences change and their ranking of those preferences change – as do their needs, perspectives, experience, knowledge, etc. An individual is not an individual is not an individual, at least not the same way a rock is a rock is a rock.

The problem of induction is problematic in natural science where dead matter is studied, even though the deathness of matter makes its properties reliable and effects predictable. Add life to the equation and the problem of induction becomes insurmountable and obviously so. 

Some things do seem to be repeated over time and the saying that “history repeats itself” may be thought to disprove the point I am making. But it doesn’t. It may be true that history tends to repeat itself if we do not learn from it, but the problem is that there is no “we” in the sense that there is a “rocks.” Individuals are different from each other and they change over time; humankind may not learn from the lessons of history, but it is equally true that situations do not repeat themselves – only man-made abstractions of them do. It is rational to learn from the essence of a situation not to repeat it or its negative consequences, but it is equally rational to say that things have changed and therefore the outcomes may do so too.

The lesson to be learned is that collectivism doesn’t work when we speak of human behavior simply because human behavior is not as tightly bound to the properties of “human” as the effects on a rock are to its properties. The reason is that human consciousness is not necessarily the same as the human body – one could possibly predict the effects of stimuli in medicine, but not in economics. Medicine works with the properties of the human body, i.e. its constitution and chemical and biological relationships (however complex); economics studies human behavior, where one individual’s choice to act is not based on the same facts as another’s, and a specific individual tends to learn – and change – from experience.

Responding to Klein and Rothbard on Agorist Organization

Tuesday, April 7th, 2009

Peter Klein wrote a blog post yesterday on the Mises Economics blog continuing the agorist vs. anarcho-capitalist discussion on organization. In his post, Klein summarized his contribution to the discussion followed by a quoting Rothbard’s assessment of agorists view on organization. But both Klein and Rothbard make unsupported general conclusions that they seem to base on some agorists’ personal preferences rather than agorist theory.

It is true that agorists in general do not fancy “organization, hierarchy, leaders and followers, etc.”, which is a common preference among anarchists of all varieties. Rothbard (and Klein) is right in that there is not necessarily anything wrong with voluntary organization or voluntary “membership” in hierarchical structures where one is subjected to the rule of majority vote or the whims of a ruler. But as good economists both Rothbard and Klein seem to assume too much: there is nothing wrong with making an informed decision to take a low-level position in a hierarchy ceteris paribus.

Ceteris paribus should here be understood as choosing in a situation where the only thing that distinguishes the hierarchical position from the non-hierarchical is hierarchy. But this is hardly ever the case in State society. Rather, individuals have to choose (if at all) from a very limited set of alternatives, where hierarchy and submission is part of all or most of the alternatives. Vietnamese children working in a Nike sweatshop are better off than as child prostitutes, ceteris paribus. But one cannot take the choices as exogenous to the political situation in the area, the region, the country, or the world. A political theory such as agorism needs to take into account the effect of political rule in the choices people make.

Agorists do just that: they realize that the limited options for a child, i.e. working in a sweat shop or becoming a prostitute, are not the result of the market but of political institutions. The choice in itself may be easy, but the context certainly isn’t. The person making the choice is subjected to political oppression through the unavailability of choices due to political regulation, rule, and coercive institutions.

This is not the same as making choices “subject to” alternatives made available in a free(d) market. The market measures costs to benefits and awards individuals with alternatives to the extent economically feasible. Political rule, however, causes imbalances in the marketplace which forcefully (directly or indirectly) removes alternatives that should have existed were it not for political oppressive rule. The choice between a sweat shop and prostitution is a choice only because of politics; it is not a “real” choice set, since it is forcefully limited.

The same is true with any choices we make today, and agorists, compared to other anarcho-capitalists, tend to put more weight on the choices that have been forcefully taken away from us. While many libertarians would compare a choice to status quo, an agorist would compare the choice situation with that which should obviously have been real in a free market. It is not an economic analysis, it is a political analysis based on a radical passion for justice.

This is relevant to the debate on organization, since agorists have a slightly different perspective than anarcho-capitalists, especially economist anarcho-capitalists. There is of course nothing supporting any counter-factual view on what would have been the case under different circumstances. But it is reasonable to draw some conclusions: the child would have more alternatives in a free market than sweat shop work and prostitution, of which some would likely have been better than both.

Only the better alternatives are important to our analysis, but it is safe to say that we can remain fairly confident that such better alternatives (subjectively identified and valued) would exist. State oppression has therefore deprived the child (in this case) from the choice he or she would have made were it not for State oppression. An economic analysis, at least using the tools commonly taught in academia, is too limited: it does not take into account the fundamental and far-reaching effect of the State on institutions and individual as well as collective behavior.

From this perspective, it is not necessarily the case that people in a freed setting would organize the way the presently choose to. It could be the case that people organize in large corporations, but it is unlikely. Why? Because people in general tend to dislike being “bossed around” by others, and they tend to very often dislike management because it is management or because they believe management’s decisions are incorrect or improper. Ask yourself: in a free(d) market, would more or fewer people choose to work in large structures where their actions are subjected to the decisions/management by others?

The answer isn’t necessarily obvious, but considering the multitude of organizational solutions that would be available were it not for the State, as well as the cost of e.g. corporation-like limited liability if fully internalized by the individual actor/organization, the answer becomes clearer. Agorists don’t despise or dislike organization per se, but I believe it is reasonable to say their analysis takes more facts into account. In quantitative economics lingo, agorists tend to control for many more variables.

So how does this relate to Klein’s post and the Rothbard quote? It provides the reason agorists, on average, are more skeptical than other libertarians to contemporary organizational structures. Agorist theory does not dismiss organization, but agorist class theory identifies, comparatively speaking, a great many more State-caused and State-inflicted problems with severe effects on the very bases on which choices are made. This makes agorists more skeptical towards organizational choices in contemporary State society.

If it were indeed the case that agorists were opposed to organization in and of itself, they would abstain from organize themselves. But this is not the case: agorists organize their efforts in the Molinari Institute as well as the Center for a Stateless Society and the Agorist Action Alliance.

Furthermore, agorists are strong proponents of voluntary organizing of free markets to create individual wealth while withdrawing support for the state to the greatest degree possible and providing real and viable free alternatives to State-controlled institutions. Agorism provides a theory for how to set the world free through liberating yourself and thereby fully take advantage of the economic incentives naturally provided in a free society. So-called counter-economics is a cornerstone in agorist theory and practice, and arranging or joining a counter-economy is voluntary in a sense no choice made in the State sanctioned market ever is. This is perhaps what distinguishes agorists from anarcho-capitalists the most: that they define “voluntary” in a much more absolutist sense.

 

Cross posted as a comment to Klein’s blog post. For more information, see my articles Saving the World through Saving YourselfA Strategy for Forcing the State Back, and my previous blog post The Savior Complex.

On Not Getting It

Friday, October 24th, 2008

As a student of economics I am exposed to idiotic statements more or less daily. What is so moronically stupid about these statements is not that they have to do with economics or that they are uttered by stupid people. On the contrary, the problem seems to permeat our postmodern society and most bright people are totally lost in “the way it is.”

What I am referring to is the scientific world view. This is not the scientific drive, i.e. the motivation to find the truth and to learn about the world, but the overly scientific anti-identification of that which is studied. It is as prevalent in the social sciences as it is in politics and buesiness management. There are no people around anymore, there’s only statistics and faceless aggregates.

In economics this is very obvious – the study of human action is almost completely reduced to discussions on how to mitigate biases and avoid multicollinearity in econometric functions. Now, in what sense would you gain understanding of why people act in certain ways through tweaking regression models? The obvious answer – and it is so obvious most economists simply don’t see it – is that you don’t. You don’t gain any knowledge whatsoever of why people acted a certain way through running tests of heteroskedasticity and deciding whether or not to use “White’s estimator.”

Economics is the most obvious victim of what I would like to call scientism, the belief that anything that uses aggregates and that is seemingly universal – through (at any price) avoiding to acknowledge the identity or personality of the individuals studied – is more valuable as a science. Actually, the common view is that as long as you can hide the fact that there are individuals in “the data” any conclusions you might draw are generally applicable.

In a recent discussion with a fellow student, I claimed that the empirical study of people is totally worthless unless your aim is to understand why exactly those individuals acted in that exact way in that exact situation. My point was that if the “experiment” would be repeated with the same people (as “data”) the outcome would be completely different because people learn. And if it would be repeated, and the situation could be set up exactly the same way, but the “data” (the people) would be different individuals the outcome would still be different – simply because they are different people and therefore react differently in a number of ways.

And on top of it all, these examples are still ridiculous – it simply isn’t possible to create the exact same situation again and expose people to it. Even if the setting (or framework) would be the same, the people would have different subjective experiences (no matter if they are “the same” or “others”), which would affect the results.

One could argue that this is why we have confidence intervals and standard deviations. But that implies that people act in such a way that the outcome of everybody’s actions are nicely distributed in a bell-shaped curve. How often would you say that happens? That would depend on what kind of people you happen to have in your sample, wouldn’t it? The point is that one cannot study people the way one studies dead matter, simply because people are people, i.e. thinking creatures that learn from experience and that aren’t reducible to a “nature” the same way a rock would be.

This “scientism” is not only prevalent in the [social] sciences – it is a cornerstone of modern politics as well as business management. In politics there is no such thing as an individual; it simply doesn’t happen that politicians discuss a certain individual. And if they happen to use the word “individual” they use it as a stereotypical “nature” of the items in the population they rule. In my ten years in party politics, I haven’t heard one politician discuss how decisions or policies affect individuals – the best I’ve heard is the use of stereotypical examples of “the average family” or “the single mom.” But never did anyone care to add flesh and blood to their dead skeletons.

There is a reason for this, even though politicians are usually too stupid to understand it. It simply isn’t possible to propose or support policies that affect people’s lives unless you make sure to forget that they are real people. Even cold-hearted, ignorant, and self-centered politicians wouldn’t have the guts nor morality to put hundreds or thousands of people in misery through pushing a button. Most people simply don’t have it in them to coldly calculate plusses and minuses while radically and forcefully change the lives of a great number of people with the stroke of a pen.

The lesson to learn is this: would there really be wars if those waging wars would see each and every person they would have to send to their deaths? It is unlikely, even though there are some really, really disturbed people out there.

The same is the case in large corporations, where the CEO or president usually has no clue about the people working for him (or her). Of course, the nature of a corporation is distinctly different from that of a state – the corporation gives, and any punishment from a corporation is to “not give”; a state takes, and any punishment is to “take more” or “kill” whereas every “reward” consists of “taking less” away from that person. Corporations can no doubt be horrible, but they are not a state.

The problem we have here is the “scientific” way of approaching one’s work: scientists who have no idea that the statistics they’re using are really people, won’t mind drawing horrible conclusions; politicians not understanding there are individuals and individual suffering as a result of every decision they make, don’t have a problem with “redistributing” from some to some or killing off some for the benefit of others; and business managers can take irresponsible risks when they can “simply”, if something goes wrong, cut the corporation’s employment with “10%” rather than, which is equally true, throw hundreds of families into unemployment and misery.

Scientism is the problem, and it arises as an effect of centralization. Centralization calls for stereotypes and grouping, for one-policy-fits-all kind of decisions, and cold-hearted leadership for some unidentified aim. What this world so desperately needs is radical decentralization. The problem with our society is not only that there is a huge parasitic cancer tumor feeding off our lives and liberties (i.e., the State), but that it is too large-scale and too centralized. Not only must the State go, but we need to get back to seeing people as people.

Seeing people as people is what so many individuals in our world have forgotten. Be they scientists, politicians or corporate managers – they all share the same fallacy in thinking that scale is a good thing, that personal ties are “in the way” and a problem for efficiency or whatever.

I am a person and I intend to continue being one. You better start seeing me as one.